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In the western tradition, the concept of political extremism is closely connected to the
exploration of non-democratic actors. The value commitment of the concept, the attitude of
rejection it expresses and its not infrequent polemical utilization in political debates have caused
numerous controversies and motivated plenty of fundamental criticism (Backes, Jesse 2005). This
article reconstructs the roots and turns of the history of the relevant ideas and demonstrates the
close interconnections with the constitutional tradition of the Occident. A sketch of the history
of the concepts follows a discussion of structural characteristics. A discussion of the possibilities
and problems inherent in finding a scientifically adequate definition is followed by a typological
examination of forms of extremism, particularly those of the 20th and 21st century. This article
primarily seeks to contribute to the clarification of the problem and to lay a foundation for
further theoretical studies which are explanatory in nature.
1. History of terms
The idea of the political extreme is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation. In
every action situation there is a midpoint (mesotes) between the too-great (hyperbole) and the
too-little (elleipsis), a distinction between the excessive and the moderate (Backes 2006). An
elaborate system of terminological categories is found in the middle and the late writings of Plato.
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Plato connected the ethics of moderation to constitutional doctrine. His continuum of
governmental form spanned the extremes of despoteia/tyrannis and anomia/lawless democracy
(in the sense of mob rule). Oligarchy, basileia (kingdom), aristocracy and legal democracy were
located between the extremes. The mean (meson), guaranteeing both moderation (metrion) and
virtue (arete), was reached through the mixture (meikte) and balancing of constitutional elements
which, taken by themselves, would be harmful (kakon) and extreme (akron). The ontological
phenomenological dimension of the differentiation of the forms of government was connected in
this way to the normative axiological dimension of the mesotes doctrine (Aalders 1968; Krämer
1959; Nippel 1980).
Aristotle freed the Platonic terms from their theological, ontological framework,
embedded them in a comprehensive scientific system and gave them a politically realistic calibre.
In his Nichomachian Ethics he established virtue or moral competence (arete) as the midpoint
(meson) or centre (mesotes) between the too-great (hyperbole) and the too-little (elleipsis), which
were meant to be the farthest ends or extremes (akron, eschaton) of an action continuum. In his
Politics he brought the ethical mesotes doctrine together with the concept of the mixed
constitution. The interests of the upper and the lower classes were to be balanced in a society
carried by the middle classes (mesoi) and to be balanced by means of an artful composition of
politically institutional organizational elements from different constitutional forms. Under the
condition of the humanly possible, Aristotle recommended “politeia”, a mixture of “oligarchic”
and “democratic” elements, as the relatively best form of government, in which the maxim of
avoiding extremes was to lead to a constitution at  the same time it  guaranteed stability  in such
matters as the liberty of citizens.
Aristotelianism, with the connection it draws between the ethical mesotes doctrine and
the theory of mixed political constitution, has shaped the history of the political idea of the
constitutional state – not least due to the mediation of scholasticism and humanism (Riklin 2006;
Sternberger 1984). The republicanism of the northern Italian city-states and later the United
States of America was able to connect to this as much as the monarchic constitutionalism of
Great Britain. The extremes were the carriers of aberrant human behaviour as well as the maxims
and social forces they were based upon. Extremes stood for depluralization and the
concentration on violence; the mean stood for pluralism and the control of violence. Two major
forms of the extreme were to be differentiated: depluralization and the unleashing of violence
could be caused by the despotic tyranny of an individual just as much as through the anarchic
rioting of the masses. Already Plato had based his two-dimensional concept on these two types
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of extremes. Aristotle took up this differentiation. The rulership of the Jacobines during the
French Revolution was not the only later event to document its continued relevance.
The ontologically axiological two-dimensionality of the Platonic-Aristotelian mesotes and
mixed constitutional doctrine offered logical possibilities for connection to the new political
taxonomy which developed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. It kept its differentiation
of “extreme” and “reasonable”/“midpoint” forms and connected these with the new terms
“right” and “left”, based upon the parliamentary seating plan. Now, so to speak, the two
traditional extremes obtained their seat at the wings of the political continuum. With the
expansion of the right-left differentiation, the old terms were also transported further, even
though they frequently severed the connection to the mixed constitutional discourse, which
partially  lost  its  importance  as  the  central  medium  of  constitutionalist  exegesis  during  the  19th
century.
The “ism” “extremism” found entry into the political language in numerous ways,
without at first establishing itself in its own enduring terminological category. This applies to its
appearance during the age of religious wars (Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester
characterized the partisans of a radical reformation as the “new scoole of extremites” [Gardiner
1546]) as well as to its introduction into the terminology of the German “Vormärz” (the liberal
philosopher Wilhelm Traugott Krug introduced the term “Extremisten” as a synonym for
“Ultraisten” [Krug 1838]). In both cases, these were times of political polarization, in which
traditional words and expressions did not seem to suffice to describe a phenomenon perceived as
an existential danger. This also applied to the Russian Revolution of 1917, which was the cause
for the term “extremism” establishing itself permanently – at first in the western states – in the
political  language.  In  France  and  England,  “extremism”  became  a  catch-phrase  which  initially
expressed fear of the looming separate peace more than fear of the consequences of the political
radicalism of the Bosheviks. For a time, “extremism” remained limited to the “extreme left” yet
was  extended  to  the  new  formation  of  the  “extreme  right”  –  fascism  –  after  the  “March  on
Rome”.
In this fashion, the term regained the comparative perspective of the Platonic-Aristotelian
categories. Spiritual isomorphies of the extremes had already been worked out by liberal
observers such as Madame de Staël and Benjamin Constant during the first few years following
the  French  Revolution  (Backes  2006:  106).  In  the  19th  century,  it  had  become  customary  to
parallel  the extremes of the political  spectrum from the vantage point of constitutionalism and,
aside from the obvious differences, to work out the analogies and structural similarities. Again
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and again, controversies were sparked by the comparative dimension inseparably connected to
the term extremism when it was introduced into scientific discussion in the 1920s.
2. Structural Characteristics
Whoever recalls the history of the terminology of the political “extreme” and of
“extremism” is able to name an entire array of structural characteristics. “Extreme” and
“extremism” determine something which is the farthest out. There is nothing beyond the extreme;
extremes cannot be increased, they embody something which cannot be surpassed or exceeded.
Saying “A is more extreme than B” or “C is the most extreme value” thus contradicts the logic of
the term.
Extremes can be conceived spatially as the ends of a distance but may be pictured equally
well as the boundary of a circular surface or even as the surface of a sphere. Under a one-, two-
or three-dimensional conceptualization, a midpoint may be established lying equidistant to the
extreme points. Ergo, the principle of equidistance is inherent in the picture of the midpoint and
the extremes.
The extremes of a distance are the points farthest removed from each other. The
relationship of the two extremes to each other as well as to the midpoint of the extremes may be
thought of as different. The extremes then form the antitheses; at the same time the midpoint
finds itself in an antithetical relationship. Nonetheless, one of the antithetical relationships is
expressed in a more pronounced fashion. In the Aristotelian tradition, the midpoint is at the
same time a point of balance between the too-great and the too-little. Here, traits, which are fully
expressed at the extremes, come to the fore in a milder form. The midpoint, often the metaphor
for equilibrium and scales, embodies the principle of moderation. In the doctrine of virtues, the
midpoint stands for morally appropriate behaviour that neither exaggerates nor understates; it
neither extends far beyond that which is imperative nor remains far behind. Virtuous behaviour is
the condition for a telos, which the individual is capable of reaching, both with and within the
society of the state: a moderate and virtuous life allows for eudemony, the unfolding of human
happiness.
In politics, Aristotle transferred the image of the midpoint and the extremes to the
doctrine of the forms of government. The midpoint corresponds to politeia, which, according to
the experience gained from the condition of the humanly possible, is the best constitution. It
creates a solid foundation for successfully striving for virtue and bliss. It mixes the fundamental
principles and components of various forms of government, especially oligarchy and democracy,
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in such a way that the middle levels dominate, the confluence of a multitude of social forces is
enabled, the exchange of interests is institutionally coordinated, and power is effectively
controlled.
With his description and recommendation of politeia, the mixed constitution, Aristotle, in
his further critical development of Plato’s late work, measurably contributed to the founding of
the constitutional state tradition of the occident. The image of the midpoint and the extremes
was closely connected to it for centuries. The extremes corresponded to negative constitutional
terms such as “tyrannis” and “despoteia”, which have a pejorative connotation and express
a defence mechanism, as the quintessence of that which is to be absolutely rejected (Mandt 2003;
Turchetti 2001).
Negative constitutional terms generally are borrowed terms, meaning that they serve as
labels for political opinions, forms of action and actors from whom one disassociates oneself
most carefully. These, therefore, also always constitute a means employed in political
argumentation, in particular aggressive vocabulary, which, in the framework of a “naming”
strategy (Adler 1978) serve for the derogative characterization of political opponents. They are
stigma words (Hermanns 1982), used to mark the boundaries of political legitimacy, to judge
others unworthy and to designate dangers. The flaunting of the extreme is a part of normalization
discourse (Link 2006), in which the majority society permanently reflects its normality and
middle. In normalization discourses, cultural power struggles find their expression in severe
criticism of unpopular opponents. The values of the minimal political consensus mandated by the
system are not always actually injured.
The use of the stigma word “extremism” on the part of a political majority culture creates
what Reinhard Koselleck called an “asymmetric” language situation (Koselleck 1979: 211-259).
The labelled cannot accept the label they are addressed with, distance themselves from the
borrowed term, doubt the load bearing capacity of its content, stress its denunciatory character
and deny its scientific causality. Now and then, there are even legal battles fought over the use of
political stigma words. For instance, the French Front National (FN) of the national populist
Jean-Marie Le Pen brought a lawsuit against its classification by the press as “extreme right”,
since the expression suggests violence (Canu 1997: 32).
In contrast, as in the case of the FN, those negatively labelled occasionally choose
another strategy turning the meaning of the label in the opposite direction. A negative borrowed
term then becomes a positive self-designation. Another language strategy of the stigmatized
consists in turning the tables on the labellers by using the negative borrowed term on them. With
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this  in  mind,  the  term  “extremism  of  the  middle”  is  sometimes  courted  (Kraushaar  2005).
However, the strategy of the restoration of symmetry in the language situation has an opportunity
for success only when the labelled or the labellers have societal power of definition at their
disposal.
The  history  of  the  terminology  of  the  “extremes”  and  of  “extremism”  proves  their
variability and dependency on context, which in the most far-reaching case can lead as far as the
expression of a “golden middle” which had previously been fought as an extreme. The contents
connected to the image of the midpoint and the extremes have been frequently subject to change;
for that reason alone, may encompass contradictory ideas and worldviews, since political
opponents sometimes make use of the term coined for them, filling it with different meaning.
In the Aristotelian tradition, enormously effective for the historical shaping of the
constitutional state, the image of the midpoint and the extremes, however, does not express such
a change of will. The quintessence of the extreme arises from a consensus over that which is to
be absolutely rejected. The consensus in the negation narrows the spectrum of possibilities of
choice thought to be legitimate, and yet allows for numerous paths to approach an aim that is
considered good. The content of the consensus over the absolutely to be rejected can be reduced
to four points: 1) Pluralism instead of monism: The state unites a number of people and human
groups whose interests and world views are different, yet, nevertheless, at the same time
legitimate. It cannot, either in its institutional design or in its communication and decision-
making processes, be formed solely based upon the maxims of a single individual or group.
2) Orientation toward a common good instead of an egoistical execution of interests: a legitimate order
must be obliged to the idea of a “bonum commune”. Under the condition of a plurality of equals,
different interests and worldviews are to be taken into consideration. A “bonum commune” as
thus understood does not, therefore, contain a comprehensive a priori common good (Sutor).
3) Rule of Law instead of arbitrary rule: A political order must be comprised of rules which are to
be adhered to by everyone, including those ruling at the moment. Without a system for the
control of power (division of power, limitation of power, distribution of competencies) this
cannot be guaranteed on a permanent basis. And, finally, 4) Self-determination instead of outside
determination: decisions are only acceptable when there exists at least a fair possibility for
participating in the decision-making process. The political system must make participation in
power possible, meaning there must be processes intended for the controlled execution of
conflicts and a formation of the will and decision-making process organized under plurality
conditions, according to the respective resulting majorities.
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3. Definitions
As  the  history  of  terminology  shows,  those  who  want  to  speak  of  “extremes”  and
“extremism” which in the framework of a scientific terminology must de-contextualize the terms
to a certain degree to free them from their changing historical contents – unless relativity has
been established as the central content. This would, however, contradict the tradition of the
history of terminology as opposing poles of a political “middle”, which causes the spread of
violence and the social balancing of interests through the “mixture” of constitutional elements.
Most of the key terms of the historical political language are used in different contexts,
monopolized by diverse political directions and instrumentalized for political arguments.
Nonetheless, hardly anyone would come to the conclusion that the word “democracy” should be
abandoned just because it has a great deal of historic terminological meaning. If new terms had to
be  invented  for  all  the  words  misused,  this  would  –  for  the  uninitiated  –  result  in  a  puzzling
artificial language which would serve more as a barrier to communication than a means of
communication. Therefore, one cannot forego defining terms of colourful, sparkling, historically
political content in such a way that popular understanding is taken into account as much as
possible, but which simultaneously achieves high selectivity.
In light of the outstanding importance of the Aristotelian heritage concerning the history
of occidental constitutionalism, designating “extremism” as the antithesis of the constitutional state
seems to suggest itself. A dichotomy, extremism/constitutional state, completes the
terminological pair of autocracy/constitutional state which Karl Loewenstein developed in his
constitutional doctrine (Loewenstein 1969: 26-29). The central criterion of differentiation
formulates a question referring to the division and the control of power. According to this,
extremism would be the – voluntary and involuntary –striving for “autocracy” (or “dictatorship”) in
the sense of the concentration and lack of control of governmental authority.
But the constitutional state and extremism cannot be determined only on the basis of the
institutional structure of the state; it also depends upon the structure and organization of the
power process. The well-known minimal definition of the constitutional state by Robert A. Dahl
establishes it as “polyarchy”, a system in which a competition for influence, power and positions
is carried out by peaceful means (Dahl 1971: 5). Such a system assumes the existence of several
competing parties and interest groups (pluralism, the legitimacy of political opposition,
institutional mechanisms for regulating the interaction between majorities and minorities – like
elections and parliaments) and the validity of an array of fundamental vested rights of citizens
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against the infringement of rights by governmental authority, as well as for participation in
political matters (such as freedom of opinion, freedom of unification, and freedom of
association). Without a functioning, power-controlling institutional structure, there is no
formation of the will and decision-making process, and competition cannot be engaged in
peacefully. Extremism thus aims at “monism” and “monocracy” in the sense of the enforcement of
a bundled claim to power which – if at all possible – eliminates any competition, does not tolerate
variety and opposition, seeks to render it harmless at the very least, stops political change,
obstructs and suppresses the autonomous commitment of groups and individuals, at least when
this stands in the way of the ambitions of the rulers (Shils 1996: 227; Lipset, Raab 1978: 6). The
idea of the citizen, therefore, belongs to the world of the constitutional state. Apart from the
mighty, there are only subordinates (underlings) in the sphere of activity of political extremes.
Extremism  as  the  antithesis  of  the  constitutional  state  can  be  more  closely  determined
beyond the institutional and procedural political level by the structure of the societal
communication process. Whereas the constitutional state corresponds to the “forum type” in
which questions of state are consequently included among public matters to be discussed in an
exchange of differing opinions in a “marketplace of political ideas”, in debate and discussion,
argumentatively, discursively, transparently, accessible and visible to everyone, “extremism aims at
the ‘palace type’” (Finer  1999:  1567),  in  which  shunning  publicity  in  matters  of  state  is  the  rule,
entitlement to have one’s say and discussion are undesirable, and the ruling strategy depends
upon the most careful preservation of the “arcana imperii”, accessible only to select circles
behind the unbugged walls of the control centre.
The tendency of the extremisms toward the “palace”, on the other hand, may be traced to
commonalities in their mental morphology. The push toward monocracy/power concentration
and monism is called forth through an exclusive demand for truth-, interpretation and organization
which pleads “higher insights”, “incontestable authorities” and/or knowledge of the “laws of
history” (historicism; Popper 1960), immunizes itself toward criticism and therefore leans toward
dogmatism. The insight and interpretation monopoly forbids the acceptance of competing
designs and gives grounds for the “impossibility of coexistence” (Lübbe 1987: 286). The plurality
of opinions, interests and life designs, in this light, prevents the absolutely-to-be-striven-for unity,
concord and harmony. Extremist ideologies develop a political power uniformity program.
Whatever does not agree with one’s own political design is interpreted away, declared illegitimate
and exterminated if necessary. Extremist ideologies unpack a bipolar, Manichaean world view
which assigns the spiritually deviant to the “kingdom of evil” and thus justifies a clear friend-foe
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differentiation. In the realm of social psychology, such thinking may be interpreted as
a consequence of intolerance of ambiguity (Reis 1997), the refusal to accept the heterogeneity and
ambiguity of the world, the complexity of life circumstances and the conflicting nature of society
as facts and to constructively put these into practice.
With their striving for the concentration of power, monistic standardization and the
conclusion of the formation of opinion- and decision-making processes, extremisms not only
undermine the liberty of the citizens: they also undermine the equality of citizens in the sense of ancient
Greek isonomy and isogory, meaning equality under the law, the right to equality and the right to
free speech and stating one’s position on matters concerning the general public. Accordingly,
extremism aims – at least in its effect (not necessarily in its intentions) – at the hierarchization of
those governing and the governed, the rulers and those ruled over, political “initiates” and the
ignorant.
4. Forms of political extremism
From the different aspects of a definition for the term “extremism”, orienting itself as the
antithesis  to  constitutional  democracy,  criteria  for  a  sensible  organization  of  the  realm  of
definitions may be established. A first possibility for this type results from the interpretation of
the modern constitutional state as regimen mixtum. The “extreme democratic” thrusting element
which  strives  for  total  equality  among citizens  and  the  permanent  and  direct  civil  execution  of
power is limited to the elementary rights of liberty on account of “monarchic” and “aristocratic”
checks and balances, for instance in the interests of a quick governmental decision, qualified
discussion in parliaments or judicial protection from infringement upon one’s rights by the
people’s will onto the elementary rights of liberty. In particular, the mixed constitution creates the
equilibrium between civil liberties and civil equality.
The  warning  against  the  extreme  democracy  of  a  mob  of  people  stirred  up  by
demagogues has been a permanent topos of the history of ideas since Plato and Aristotle. The
modern constitutional state is in need of the monarchic and aristocratic counterbalance no less
than was the ancient state. For within that state, the principle of equality, in contrast to the older
constitutionalism, gained validity even more strongly in the aftermath of the revolutions in
America and France. The group with full citizenship expanded step-by-step to include all adult
citizens. The ethos of the fundamental equality of human beings, having sprung from ancient
sources (especially the stoa), channeled by Christianity, humanism and the Enlightenment, has
gradually overcome the natural categorical inequality of women, slaves and strangers, basing the
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constitutional state on a broad foundation of the people. The democratic constitutional state
forms a tense synthesis of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements. It has, therefore,
often been described as a complexio oppositorum. Alois Riklin – in a critical connection to Dolf
Sternberger – has called attention anew to the importance of the tradition of the mixed
constitution for the unfolding of occidental constitutionalism (Riklin 2006: 401-423).
Insight into the mixed nature of the constitutional state makes it possible to differentiate
forms of political extremism according to the thrust of their respective main directions. Is the
democratic element being over-extended to a degree that would endanger civil liberties? Or is the
liberty  of  certain  citizens  to  be  held  high  at  the  expense  of  civil  equality?  According  to  the
dimensions of civil equality and civil liberty, one may distinguish an anti-democratic from an anti-
constitutional thrust. The former undermines civil equality – for instance in the form of the axiom
of fundamental human equality – which in the form of the idea of human rights, constitutes the
ethical foundation of the constitutional state of the present. The latter aims at the power-
controlled set of regulations which is to ensure civil liberty. Carl J. Friedrich has described the
creation of the modern constitutional state as a process of the merging of democracy (in the
sense of equality and the people’s sovereignty) and constitutionalism (a plurality-ensuring, power-
controlled institutional structure) (Friedrich 1950). However, for an analytical differentiation,
there arises a problem with respect to the definition of extremism. Is the combination of anti-
constitutionalism and anti-democratism a necessary requirement when speaking of extremism?
Or would one of the two dimensions suffice? Theoretically, the two dimensions can be combined
into four typical ideal forms (see Figure 1):
Figure 1. (Anti-)Democracy and (Anti-)Constitutionalism Combined.
(Anti-)Constitutionalism
(Anti-)
Democracy
(1) Democratic
Anti-
Constitutionalism
(2) Constitutional
Anti-
Democratism
(3) Anti-
Constitutional
Anti-
Democratism
(4) Constitutional
Democracy
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The three first types: democratic anti-constitutionalism, constitutional anti-democratism and anti-
constitutional anti-democratism (or rather anti-democratic anti-constitutionalism) negate basic
principles of the constitutional state; in this sense, type four, democratic constitutionalism,
constitutes the antithesis of the other three (Backes 2000: 46). The first form stands for an
ideology/movement which answers the ethos of fundamental equality of human beings, rejecting,
however, the power-controlling design of the constitutional state. This might apply to all the
communist and anarchist doctrines in as far as one were to take seriously their radically egalitarian
manner of seeing themselves. The second form would apply to Aristotle’s politeia,
a constitutional state on the basis of slavery – a pattern which is still found in many of the North-
American republics of the founding days and marked the domestic policy arguments of the USA
until well into the 20th century. Regarding the present, one might think of the followers of
Apartheid on a constitutional basis (as in the former South Africa). The third form is found in
Hitler’s and the other leading national socialists’ world view: radical negation of the ethos of the
fundamental equality of human beings in favour of national racism connected to the propagation
of the totalitarian leader state, which eliminates the system assuring civil liberty in a process of
“Gleichschaltung” (forcing into line).
If one were to reserve the term “extremism” for the combination of both dimensions,
one would exempt ideologies/movements which aim at the elimination of the constitutional state
or the exclusion of parts of the population from assuring essential basic rights. For a historical
view of the hatching of democratic constitutional states (the process of democratizing the
constitutional state) and their political antipodes, it is most important to separate both
dimensions. Their differentiation is also of great importance for the analysis of the present. Yet it
would contradict the current understanding to the greatest possible extent if one were to reserve
the term “extremism” for the combination of enmity with democracy and constitutionalism.
However, a definition of extremism which calls only for one of the two dimensions has
its price: in the strictest sense, as soon as only one of the two dimensions is available, it no longer
has  anything  to  do  with  an  exclusively  antithetical  relationship,  so  that  anti-democratism  is
connected to constitutional orientations or – in the reverse – anti-constitutionalism to democratic
values. If such ideological relationships pass themselves off as “extremism”, the definition no
longer incorporates the idea of the farthest-reaching or unsurpassable. Moreover, the respective
conviction systems on the “freedom axis” between the assumed midpoint and the extremes move
a bit closer toward the direction of the middle. In this way, a political space is created in which
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one must differentiate between “extreme” and “more extreme” (or “softer” and “harder”) forms
– actually a contradictio in adjecto.
Still, whoever holds fast to the definition of extremism of only one of the aforementioned
two dimensions must be aware of the problematic situation and pay his dues to it when it comes
to the analysis of political ideologies. What is more, the dimensions of “anti-democratism” and
“anti-constitutionalism” may be further subdivided. By doing so, “anti-constitutionalism” gives
rise to further partial domains like anti-parliamentarianism, anti-liberalism (in the sense of the
restriction  and  the  suspension  of  liberal  rights)  or  anti-pluralism  (such  as  anti-party  affect  and
interest-group prudishness). In anti-democratism, one would, for instance, have to differentiate
between anti-egalitarianism with regard to individual liberties (e.g., discrimination against
minorities) and the relationship to the people’s sovereignty. A definition of extremism should, in
any case, be drawn up in such a way that the negation of at least one dimension is required,
without which a democratic constitutional state would not be worth the name. This includes the
ethos of the fundamental equality of human beings as a basic value, along with the political
pluralism of parties and associations, the thereby-connected autonomy of civil commitment, the
legitimacy of political opposition, the periodic conducting of elections (in which the traditional
principles of democratic voting law exist), as well as a number of indispensable basic rights (such
as  freedom  of  opinion,  freedom  of  association  and  freedom  of  assembly)  and  their  guarantee
through a power-balancing institutional structure (legitimacy of government, parliamentary
control, an independent judiciary).
Differentiating between the two dimensions, anti-democratism and anti-constitutionalism,
has a great deal in common with Noberto Bobbio’s two-dimensional subdivision of the political
realm. The differentiation between extremism/autocracy and the constitutional state orients itself
with respect to the principle of (individual) freedom whereas that between “right” and “left”
orients itself with respect to the principle of equality. Both dimensions are not thought to be
parallel  but  rather  axes  crossing  each  other  (Bobbio  1996:  72).  Accordingly,  aside  from
a temperate constitutional state oriented right and left, there is also an extreme autocratic right
and left which favours autocratic leadership forms.
Bobbio’s two-dimensional division of the political realm may be connected to the above-
introduced dimensions of “anti-democratism” and “anti-constitutionalism”. In this way,
a spiritual, politically traditional connection comes to the fore, and the “axis of freedom” with
a catalogue of values and institutional processing regulations experiences concretization. As
shown in Figure 2, the political realm may be grasped two-dimensionally by differentiating
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between a constitutionalism and a democracy axis. The extreme poles of constitutionalism are
termed “anarchic” and “totalitarian”. “Anarchic” anti-constitutionalism negates every form of
national order whereas the “totalitarian” pole develops a claim to omnipotence which penetrates
all societal realms, disintegrating the separation of the public and the private realm. The extreme
poles of the axis of democracy are called “extreme-egalitarian” and “anti-egalitarian”. Here,
“democracy” primarily describes the equality dimension. Following Bobbio’s plausible
classification on the equality axis, it is identical with the traditional right-left dimension.
Figure 2. Forms of political extremism in a two-dimensional political space (anti-democratism/anti-
constitutionalism).
anarchic
totalitarian
anti-egalitarianextreme-egalitarian
Constitutionalism Axis
Democracy Axis
constitutionally
-democratic
spectrum
Anarcho-
commu-
nism
Marxism-
Leninism
National
Socialism
On the constitutionalism axis, the focus is on the control of power and assurance of plurality
speak  to  civil  liberty,  whereas  on  the  democracy  axis,  the  subject  is  the  relationship  to  the
principles of civil equality and the sovereignty of the people. The extreme right and left, tending
toward autocratic solutions, are similar in their anti-constitutionalism but differ in their
classification on the democracy axis. According to its way of seeing itself, Marxism-Leninism may
be described after this scheme as “democratic anti-constitutionalism” and national socialism as
“anti-democratic anti-constitutionalism”. Nevertheless, these are only rough classifications. The
different ideological variants (Leninism and Stalinism distinguish themselves from each other just
as Hitler’s and Rosenberg’s national socialism does) would have to be described more exactly and
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individually, whereby the terminological clusters “anti-democratism” and “anti-constitutionalism”
would be broken down into their individual components in the manner already described. In this
depiction, anarchism takes up its own individual position. As anarcho-communism it connects an
“extreme-egalitarian” view, with an anarchic-subversive orientation. Besides, there is no lack of
ideological connection between anti-egalitarianism and anarchism; only practically speaking has it
remained almost meaningless, therefore not having found acceptance in the diagram.
Religious political fundamentalism, which has gained political importance at the edges of
all world religions, in particular in the Islamic cultural circle during the last few decades,
nevertheless clearly shows that the two dimensions, anti-constitutionalism and anti-democratism,
in no way suffice to adequately comprehend the spectrum of political extremisms on the level of
their own ideological and programmatic self-knowledge. The relationship to the egalitarian
principle is obvious, and therefore classification on the equality axis is not crucial for these forms.
Another line of conflict, namely that determined by the question regarding the relationship
between religion and the state, appears to be more important. To explain these facts more clearly,
one may think of the political sphere as being two-dimensional, whereby the democracy axis is
replaced by an axis of religion (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Forms of political extremism in the two-dimensional political sphere (constitutionalism-/fundamentalism
axis).
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The extreme poles of this axis may be labelled enmity toward religion, and theocracy. As far as
enmity toward religion is concerned, this would address ideologies which condemn every form of
belief  in  a  hereafter  as  an  intellectual  attack  on  reason  and  meet  the  followers  of  such  a  belief
with intolerance. An example for the connection of enmity toward religion and totalitarian anti-
constitutionalism is found in Lenin’s and Stalin’s communism, with its systematic killing of
priests, the destruction or desecration of churches, the “movement of the godless” and other
excesses. Characteristically, enmity toward religion springs from a state ideology which, like the
state religion of theocracy, claims absoluteness (of superior rationality). Here, too, extremes meet.
The essential difference lies in the radical worldliness of the enmity-toward-religion ideology,
standing in sharp contrast to the otherworldliness of a fundamentalist political theology.
Rulership-wise, theocracy may approach enmity-of-religion totalitarianism in the same measure in
which the claim of God’s reign on Earth is faithfully put into effect. The reign of the Taliban in
Afghanistan comes close to this relationship.
To explain the independence of the three dimensions of political extremism in the
spiritual political realm, a three-dimensional depiction with a constitutionalism, a democracy and
a fundamentalism axis suggests itself (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Forms of political extremism in the three-dimensional sphere.
anarchic
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anti-egalitarianextreme-egalitarian
hostile toward religion
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The more unconditionally certain organizations, in their ideological programmatic self-
interpretation, strive toward the extreme poles in their spiritual-political realm, the more
pronounced their tendency may be – by summoning every possible means – to impose their
proposed absolute aims in their claim of exclusive truth, interpretation and design. The
conviction of the superiority of their own insight and prognostic capability, in combination with
the  claim  of  preventing  a  catastrophe  and  “putting  the  world  to  rights  again”  and/or  creating
a new world, leads from intellectual self-empowerment to action. Their grandiose aims, seen as
sacrosanct, allow for the use of violence and, in the extreme case, even mass murder as legitimate.
Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to see the use of violence or illegal methods as defining
characteristics of political extremism. The question of the use of violence and the breaking of
norms may – independent of the respective ideological programmatic orientation – be answered
differently from the perspective of different strategic considerations. The political behaviour of
the NSDAP at the beginning of the 1930s shows that extremist ideology and the practice of
violence do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. Their legal tactics took advantage of the widespread
relativistic understanding of democracy in the Weimar state. Thus, Goebbels (1935: 71) could
announce  frankly:  “We  are  entering  the  Reichstag  to  supply  ourselves  from  the  arsenal  of
democracy with their own weapons. We are becoming representatives of the Reichstag to
immobilize Weimar convictions with their own support. If democracy is so stupid as to give us
free tickets and diets for this bad turn, it is its own business. To us, every legal means is welcome
to revolutionize today’s conditions.”
The  moulding  of  ideology  does  not  allow  for  any  compelling  logic  with  respect  to
strategic  behaviour.  Can  one,  then,  in  a  stringent  manner,  make  any  assumptions  from  the
ideological programmatic structure about the type of autocracy which is to be expected after
a power takeover? Here, one must exercise caution as the processes of the transformation and
the establishment of autocracy depend, to a large degree, on the respective political conditions of
power, the institutional requirements and socio-economic conditions, as well as the cultural
framework. At the same time, one can deduce basic political intentions and forms of legitimation
from  the  ideology  of  a  political  movement  that  give  a  direction  to  the  moulding  of  the  to  be
expected regime. Therefore, the communist education dictatorship in the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism is structured in the same way as the charismatic leader dictatorship in the doctrines of
fascism and national socialism. In a similar way, one can assume theocratic traits for establishing
a successful autocracy in political religious fundamentalism.
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Can evidence also be found to answer the question about the “authoritarian” or
“totalitarian” moulding of autocracy? From the degree of moulding and the configuration of the
structural characteristics of extremist ideologies, conclusions should be possible about the degree
of depluralization to be expected and “thorough domination” of a society. The experience of the
totalitarian regimes of the 20th century suggests that a utopian piety heightens the probability of
totalitarian rulership practice, since the utopia is able to deliver a foundation for the justification
of a rigorous transformation, “Gleichschaltung” (forcing into line) and “cleansing” of society.
In historical reality, some extremisms defy clear classification, since they practice political
mimicry, cover up their true intentions with guarded diction and respectable behaviour, and deny
any connection with historically known forms. Furthermore, there are parties found in many
European democracies which present an ambiguous appearance, since they – as in the case of
some of the post-communist parties – undergo an acculturation processes, accommodate
different trends with partially contradictory orientations and – figuratively speaking – stand with
one foot in the extremist and the other foot in the constitutionally democratic spectrum. Also, at
the right as well as the left edge of party systems, there are intellectual grey areas between radical,
yet still system-conforming criticism of the status quo, and declared enmity toward the system.
Populist parties, often containing unusual mixtures of “left” and “right” ideological elements,
often show a diffuse programmatic appearance (Decker 2004; Hartleb 2004; Meny, Surel 2002;
Thieme 2005). In such cases, it seems advisable to practice caution in dealing with the extremism
concept, if it is not to be watered down. Instead, one may speak of “extreme tendencies”. Also,
the concept introduced into the Anglo-Saxon discussion of “system loyalty”, “semi-loyalty”, and
“illoyalty”  seems  suitable  for  a  more  discriminating  understanding  of  the  transitional  realm
between a clear orientation on the fundamental values and rules of democratic constitutional
states and their unequivocal negation.
5. Outlook
A definition of extremism in the sense of the rejection of basic values and rules of the
game in the democratic constitutional state in no way amounts to the same thing as seeing
extremism as a consequence of negations and reactions. A look at history tells us that
constitutional states came into existence only several thousand years after the first high cultures
had come into being at the shores of the large rivers Euphrates, Tigris and Nile. Someone
thinking along the lines of the concentration of powers, monism and monocracy may thus claim
“older rights” and, in addition, point to the world-wide dominance of non-constitutional forms
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of state over the period of many centuries.  Therefore,  it  was not at  all  absurd when one of the
most extravagant intellectual endeavours in the age of the radical revolutionary changes in
America and France sought to establish proof of the “natural state” of founding-father
patrimonialism and the merely residual importance of republicanism (Haller).
The autocracies are older than the constitutional states, and have accompanied their
development and sustained themselves on a global scale until well into the present, regardless of
all the waves of democratization (Huntington 1993). Thereby, the ideocracies or worldview
dictatorships, with their totalitarian traits, form rather an exception, whereas those forms which
at many points correspond to the Aristotelian description of tyrannies to a large degree make up
the majority. Among the present-day autocracies there are not only a few which – like the
theocratic system in Iran or so-called “sultanism” (Chehabi, Linz 1998) – partially carry archaic
traits. Now that the most beautiful dreams of the flowering transitology of the nineties have
dissipated, comparative system research has, in addition, adopted new “hybrid” regimes, which
connect the typical characteristics of autocracy to those of the constitutional state (Diamond
2002; Bendel, Croissant, Rüb 2002).
Aside from vital autocracies there is no lack of intellectual trends which de-legitimize the
constitutional state and point in adventurous new directions. This is why radical globalization
critics, in their leanings toward Marx and Lenin, see the expansion of liberal democracy and
market economy as theoretical imperialism (Hardt, Negri 2003). Anarchism, historically not
burdened by oppressive regimes, is developing new attractiveness (Chomsky 2005). Leading
thinkers of a so-called “new right” are unmasking fascism, communism and liberalism as equally
totalitarian (Benoist 1998). The populist “Zeitgeist” offers manifold combinations of “left” and
“right”  in  a  twilight  zone  between  constitutional  democracy  and  extremism  (Mudde  2007:  31).
And now that the “third universal theory”, introduced by Muammar Al-Gaddafi in the 1980s, has
mercifully disappeared into oblivion, the “milestones” of the Egyptian Muslim brother Sayyid
Qutb are being viewed as a political revelation in Islamistic circles. Islamism is obstructing liberal
development using both terrorist and non-terrorist variants. The religion factor has unexpectedly
furthered the formation of political ideologies in other cultural circles as well aiming at “integral”
rulership methods that force back every other design claim as illegitimate.
It  would  hardly  be  meaningful  if  one  were  to  restrict  the  term  in  such  a  way  that
extremism were to be seen as a reaction to 20th century totalitarianism. A world-historical view
may, for good reasons, reach the final conclusion that autocratic systems and extremist efforts
aimed at establishing them are just as strongly anthropologically anchored as those trains of
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thought and worldview is that further constitutionally democratic solutions. The tendency
popular in old consolidated democracies (such as Great Britain) to see extremisms as marginal
minorities (the lunatic fringe) may be correct for some bizarre species; nevertheless, altogether,
this shows a certain arrogance which dissipates quickly as soon as one calls forth the memory of
the historical political conditionality of the “experiment of freedom” (Kielmansegg 1988).
However, to take seriously the challenges of political extremism in the future does not
mean one should make a case for alarmism and exorcism. If a certain justification may be
ascribed to the formulation the “extremism of the middle” which is frequently used in polemical
contexts,  it  is  in  vain  that  the  political  middle  –  in  the  sense  of  the  system-carrying  trends  of
democratic constitutional states – and extremisms (as long as they are not completely marginal)
mostly stand in an interrelationship to each other. Based upon experience, in a certain way they
belong to the “normal household” of open societies. The success of particular forms of
extremism often points to weaknesses and oversights by the political majority culture. Criticism
from an extremist vantage point may frequently be exaggerated but sometimes also contains
a grain of truth. Extremism – like prison – is in some respects a mirror image of social
development, and allows for conclusions about the condition of the majority society. The
mesotes doctrine permits the insight that the midpoint contains something of the extremes. They
over-expand those principles which, in temperate and balanced form, are of use. Above all,
political extremisms that act within the framework of legality may, in such a way – like poisons
that,  in  small  doses,  develop  healing  effects  –  give  an  impetus  to  course  corrections,  point  to
neglected  problem  areas  and,  lastly  –  aside  from  their  disintegrating  effects  –  bring  about
integrative effects. The friends of the constitutional state should therefore refrain from
a Manichaean crusade mentality, which, due to the resolution of mercilessly combating extremism
has led to the behavioural patterns of the antipodes. For a middle which wishes to push its aims
to their final conclusion, itself becomes extreme.
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